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Abstract— This paper assumes the hypothesis that human 
learning is perception based, and consequently, the learning 
process and perceptions should not be represented and 
investigated independently or modeled in different simulation 
spaces. In order to keep the analogy between the artificial and 
human learning, the former is assumed here as being based on 
the artificial perception. Hence, instead of choosing to apply or 
develop a Computational Theory of (human) Perceptions, we 
choose to mirror the human perceptions in a numeric 
(computational) space as artificial perceptions and to analyze the 
interdependence between artificial learning and artificial 
perception in the same numeric space, using one of the simplest 
tools of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing, namely the 
perceptrons. As practical applications, we choose to work around 
two examples: Optical Character Recognition and Iris 
Recognition. In both cases a simple Turing test shows that 
artificial perceptions of the difference between two characters and 
between two irides are fuzzy, whereas the corresponding human 
perceptions are, in fact, crisp.  
 
Keywords—crisp human perception, fuzzy artificial 
perception, perceptron 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N the last decade, Zadeh pointed out the necessity of 
introducing a Computational Theory of Perceptions (CTP). 
More precisely, Zadeh outlined in [21] a computational theory 
of human perceptions, i.e. a formal theory which should 
enable software agents to compute (and hopefully, to reason) 
with human perceptions “described by propositions drawn 
from a natural language” [21] as answers to some questions. 
The process of describing human perceptions in a natural 
language sets out a correspondence perceptions-propositions 
and results in what Zadeh called “perception-based 
information” (PBI). Here in this paper PBI is viewed as a 
special syntactic-semantic representation space, as a subset of 
legal syntaxes within a given natural language, which are 
charged with fuzzy meanings. As an example, from a syntactic 
point of view, there is  nothing  fuzzy  about the  string “young  
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person”, whereas the fuzzy meaning that humans usually 
associate to this string makes it f-granular. By paraphrasing 
Zadeh, this means that the boundaries of perceived “young 
person” class are unsharp and the values of age ranges are 
represented in natural language as fuzzy linguistic labels (for 
example: “young”, “middle aged”, “old” etc.), as f-granules of 
(perceived) age, where, as Zadeh said, “a granule being a 
clump of values (points, objects) drawn together by 
indistinguishability, similarity, proximity, and function” [21].  
Zadeh illustrated the fact that perceptions are represented in 
natural language as propositions by giving the following 
example [21]: “it is unlikely that there will be a significant 
increase in the price of oil in the near future” (which is further 
denoted here as A) – an assertion that aggregates together 
fuzzy linguistic labels (words – from the syntactic point of 
view, perceptions – from the semantic point of view) as aliases 
of some f-granules of perceived likelihood („is unlikely‟), 
amplitude of variation („significant increase‟) and time („near 
future‟).  
However, here we assume that instead of representing a 
human perception, the assertion A is a piece of knowledge 
belonging in an economical theory of oil market. How 
meaningful is A (the message) depends at least on the writer 
(the source of the message), reader (the destination of the 
message) and on the context in which they communicate (the 
environment). For example, the credibility and the meaning 
that the reader could assign to the enounce A vary dramatically 
when instead of being asserted by a six years old kid it is 
announced by a spokesman of British Petroleum. Conversely, 
even if the most qualified economist of the oil market makes 
the assertion A, there will be dramatic differences between the 
ways in which different people of different ages and 
qualifications would assign a meaning to it. Moreover, the 
assertion A could be just a part of a communication strategy 
whose goal is to manipulate the market players.  
Since the meanings given by different people to the 
assertion A are far enough from being “drawn together by 
indistinguishability, similarity, proximity, and function” [21], 
the example given by Zadeh actually illustrates that assigning 
certain meanings to a human perception represented as a 
proposition in a natural language could result in very volatile / 
unstable results. On the other hand, such an operation is very 
similar with trying to decode a message without knowing how 
exactly the message was encoded in the first place.  
This paper assumes the hypothesis that human learning is 
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perception based, and consequently, the learning process and 
perceptions should not be represented and investigated 
independently or modeled in different simulation spaces. On 
the other hand, in order to keep the analogy between the 
artificial and human learning, the former is assumed here as 
being based on the artificial perception. Hence, instead of 
choosing to apply or develop a Computational Theory of 
(human) Perceptions [21], we choose to mirror the human 
perceptions in a numeric (computational) space - as artificial 
perceptions, and to analyze the interdependence between 
artificial learning and artificial perception in the same 
numeric space. An alternative that we do not follow here 
would be to consider learning process as a topic of Artificial 
Intelligence and perceptions as a topic of a Computational 
Theory of Perceptions. This paper analyzes the 
interdependence between learning and perceptions using one 
of the simplest tools of Artificial Intelligence and Soft 
Computing, namely the perceptrons [15]. As practical 
applications, we choose to work around two examples: Optical 
Character Recognition (OCR) and Iris Recognition (IR). 
A. Outline 
The first question that must be answered here is what exactly 
do we understand here by “artificial perception”. The second 
section of this work discusses this topic.  
As it can be seen in [21], Zadeh insists on the ideas that 
(human) “perceptions, in general, are both fuzzy and granular 
or, for short, f-granular” and that “in much, perhaps most, of 
human reasoning and concept formation, the granules are 
fuzzy” - i.e. human reasoning and the concepts are f-granular.  
However, in the two examples that follow to be presented 
here, the situation is a little bit different: in both cases a simple 
Turing test [18] shows that artificial perceptions of the 
difference between two different characters and between two 
different irides are fuzzy, whereas the corresponding human 
perceptions are, in fact, crisp. Despite being contradictory to 
Zadeh‟s beliefs expressed above, this situation comes very 
naturally, because ultimately, a perceptron emulates the 
human intelligent behavior through an artificial one, which 
compared to the original is weakened and imprecise enough. 
The third and the fourth sections from here aim to illustrate 
this situation in detail using the practical examples of OCR 
and IR, respectively. Concluding remarks of this study are 
presented in the fifth section. 
II. THE ARTIFICIAL PERCEPTION 
In their seminal work, McCulloch and Pitts [10] formalized 
the neural networks as a recursively constructed language of 
temporal propositional expressions [10] (build by 
complexification rules with elementary proposition such as 
Ni(t) – i.e. the unit i fires at time t). This means that, naturally, 
a neural network is fully described if we know its structure 
and if we know why, when and how its neurons fire. Later, 
Rosenblatt [15], [16] took two important steps further in 
Artificial Intelligence (AI). Firstly, he defined the Perceptron 
as an elementary virtual (simulated / artificial) unit able to 
encode artificial perceptions in a manner similar to that in 
which is assumed that the human brain supports visual 
perception [15]. Secondly, he advanced the field of neural 
networks from a theoretical study to practical implementations 
on circuits [16]. 
A. Artificial Intelligence vs. Human Intelligence 
Somehow paradoxically, the two works of McCulloch, Pitts 
[10] and Rosenblatt [15], [16], taken together, still drawn the 
limits in which the neural networks have been modeled and 
used up to this date. Of course, some improvements and some 
diversification are visible with respect to the structure 
(recurrent networks, for example), dynamic (self-organizing 
maps [9], for example), neuron design (fuzzy [19] and neo-
fuzzy neurons [20]) and to the area of application [1], [2], [4], 
[5], [7], [8]. However, all of these newer developments and 
variations are much too close, and too tributary to the initial 
design specified by McCulloch, Pitts and Rosenblatt. Maybe 
this is the reason why, as J. Copeland said in [6], “five decades 
since the inception of AI have brought only very slow 
progress, and early optimism concerning the attainment of 
human-level intelligence has given way to an appreciation of 
the profound difficulty of the problem”. Still, it should be very 
clear for anybody that there is no such logical thing as 
criticizing AI in itself. All AI tools are our creations and they 
have only those limitations that we cannot overcome when we 
design them. Hence, the problem of programming artificial 
intelligent agents is recursively depending on itself: the AI 
tools would not have unwanted/unexpected limitations if 
someone (or something) could be able to design them 
intelligently. The lower our level of understanding (our own) 
intelligence, the greater the limitations of the AI tools that we 
design. The vicious circle does not break here because, in 
order to find what intelligence is, we should start 
knowing/acquiring this concept through as many of its 
hypostases as possible, but on the other hand, the task of 
recognizing the hypostases of intelligence is not always simple 
and successful. Moreover, even that we may recognize a 
hypostasis of intelligence, there is no guarantee that we could 
understand how it is produced. Hence ultimately, if we accept 
that AI is “the science of making computers do things that 
require intelligence when done by humans” [6], we should 
also accept that the limitations of our AI tools originate in our 
limited knowledge of ourselves and, by consequence, in our 
limited capacity of designing them intelligently.  
Another problematic issue in the present state of AI is a very 
well established tendency for overvaluation, whose roots 
grown right from the beginnings. For example, despite the fact 
that Rosenblatt introduced the perceptrons as elementary units 
designed to encode artificial perceptions (as their name 
suggests), when he approached the “mathematical analysis of 
learning in the perceptron” [15], he involuntarily made an 
association between learning and perceptrons. Over time, this 
association somehow has come to be treated, seen and claimed 
as it would be a strong bound between learning and 
perceptrons, a bound whose strength increased in time for no 
plausible logical reasons, only by frequent use, overvaluation 
and mistake. 
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B. Overvaluation 
The belief that perceptrons learn is widely spread today in AI 
community and often treated as an objective fact. The truth is 
that human learning is something much more complex than 
the process of “learning in the perceptron” [15]. The latter is 
nothing more than an expression denoting a very basic piece 
of learning, namely a process that encodes (memorizes) 
experiences in a numeric space. This process results in a 
collection of numbers called trained memory. However, the 
process of human learning results (among many other things) 
in texts like this one that we write here, i.e. in well-articulated 
logical discourses about a certain part of reality perceived by 
us. Our discourses are pieces of complex knowledge expressed 
with formal correctness and produced by our brain – a 
complex system of neural networks able to play cooperative 
games, able to make massively distributed and massively 
parallel computations, but unfortunately unable to describe 
itself. This is why reverse engineering the human brain is one 
of the most relevant tasks for all AI sub-disciplines of our days 
and is the only task that could make us hope we will ever 
succeed to endow a machine with artificial learning 
capabilities. 
The discrepancy between expectations and achievements in 
AI is fueled by over-valuation in the first place. Any objective 
and well-educated mind knows that what a system could 
achieve depends on how controllable it is and on what states 
are observable. In other words, from a formal standpoint, what 
is achievable on a given system is syntactically correct and 
semantically relevant (all in all, is formally demonstrable) in 
the formal language and theory that describe the system. 
Hence, full understanding of a given system means that our 
expectations and system behavior perfectly match each other.  
The overvaluation occurs especially in the cases in which an 
observable state is treated as being something that it is not 
and/or as having properties that it does not have. A special 
paradigm of learning treated in AI is that of supervised 
learning by exposure to examples. The simplest case assumes 
that a perceptron learns to differentiate between two classes of 
examples (learns a binary classification). We marked the 
sequence “perceptron learns” because, as this paper follows to 
show, it is more appropriate to say that the (memory of a) 
perceptron encodes the separation between two linearly 
separable classes of examples. The process of learning is far 
much complicated (as a routine) and far more spectacular as 
results than the simple mechanical encoding procedure 
through which a perceptron memorizes the separation between 
two classes of examples. Human learning, artificial learning, 
artificial perception and mechanical encoding actually are four 
different things in AI: human learning is a target behavior, 
artificial learning is a computational simulation of human 
learning, artificial perception is an analogy of human 
perception, learning is perception based and mechanical 
encoding is a procedure that may allow artificial perception. 
Saying that mechanical encoding is the same thing with 
artificial perception or with artificial learning is nothing else 
than overvaluation. Talking about learning without making the 
differences between human and artificial learning is also an 
overvaluation of the latter. 
C. What is the Artificial Perception? 
Firstly, let us discuss about the artificial representation of 
human perception and to illustrate them on the simple case of 
a binary classification encoded as a trained memory. Let us 
consider two classes C+ and C− of linearly separable n-
dimensional positive and negative  examples,  respectively (as  
 
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of two linearly separable classes 
 
those represented in Fig. 1 ), used as training examples for the 
artificial neuron (perceptron) described in Fig. 2, where:  
X=[x1, x2, … , x𝑛 ] 
is the current example applied to the neuron,   
W=[w1, w2, … , w𝑛 ] 
is the synaptic memory, θ is the threshold and the fire function  
Y
±
(X) = f
±
(X, W, θ) 
establishes the instant input-output relation of the neuron: 
f
±
(X, W, θ) = sign(W.X - θ), (1) 
as a function depending on the instant internal activation of 
the neuron: 
h(X, W) = W.X, (2) 
and on the threshold θ, where the dot operation in formula (2) 
signifies the scalar product. 
 
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of a perceptron 
 
With these notations, the (memory of the) neuron is said to be 
trained if and only if: 
∀X ∈ C+∪C−, Y±(X) = IC+(X) - ICˉ(X), (3) 
where IC
+ 
and ICˉ are the regular indicator functions (binary 
membership functions / characteristic functions) of classes C
+
 
and Cˉ, hence:  
Y
±
(X) = 1 iff 
CX  and Y±(X) = -1 iff CX . (4) 
Hence, if the (memory of the) neuron is trained, then: 
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Y
±
(C
+
) = {+1} and Y
±
(Cˉ) = {-1}. (5) 
The case from above describes an artificial neuron with 
bipolar output (±1). When the output is binary, the classes 
may be denoted as C
1
 and C
0
, whereas the (memory of the) 
neuron is said to be trained if and only if: 
∀X ∈ C0∪C1, Y01 X = IC1(X), (6) 
where IC
1
 is the indicator function of class C
1 
and the new 
instant input-output relation is as follows: 
f 
01
(X, W, θ) = logical( f±(X, W, θ) + 1 ){0,1}. (7) 
With these notations, if the (memory of the) neuron is trained, 
then: 
Y 
01
(C
1
) = {1} and Y 
01
(C
0
) = {0}. (8) 
In the two cases described above, each of the formulae (5) 
and (8) is an artificial representation of the human perception 
illustrated in Fig. 1, representation written in a first order 
logico-arithmetic formal language that aggregates constants 
(±1 or 0,1), inputs (X), states / memory instances (W, θ) and 
outputs (Y) accordingly to the production rules (1)-(8), as 
appropriate. If we do not wish to know such an artificial 
representation as a predicate, we still have the possibility to 
know it as an internal state (as a numeric constant), namely as 
the trained memory (Wt, θt). However, interpreting the 
assertion (Wt, θt) means to assign certain meanings to (a 
human perception represented as) a proposition (Wt, θt) 
written in a numerical language, a process that could result in 
very volatile / unstable results if the encoding-decoding rules 
(1)-(8) are not known, just like in the case of assertion A 
discussed in the introduction. On the contrary, knowing the 
production rules (1)-(8) may allow one to produce a different 
trained memory  W t, θ t , which still has the same meaning as 
(Wt, θt). 
Consequently, the above examples and comments illustrate 
that human perceptions are encodable (human perceptions can 
be artificially represented) as trained memory sequences 
(numeric constants) even by using simplified models of the 
perceptron initially proposed by Rosenblatt [15], [16]. What is 
new here is the fact that we point out to a second form of 
artificial representation for the human perceptions, which 
consists in pieces of formal knowledge (not just in numeric 
constants), in demonstrable formulae within specific logico-
arithmetic formal theories associated to a certain perceptron 
design.  
Regardless their particular type, for the artificial 
representations of the human perceptions to become artificial 
perceptions, it is necessary that the artificial agent who finds 
and stores them to be self-aware and aware of the meanings 
that these artificial representations have. Hypothetically, an 
artificial agent that would actually have artificial perceptions 
should be able to produce propositions like “I perceive 
that …” and should to be aware of their meanings. 
Nevertheless, self-awareness and understanding meanings are 
open problems in AI today. Until the moment when significant 
progress will have been made on these two directions, the 
artificial perception is just a meaning (and a name) assigned 
in and by our mind for an artificial representation of some 
human perception. However, we analyze the possibility of 
developing self-aware software agents based on the basic 
design of a Cognitive Intelligent Agent given in [14]. 
III. HUMAN VS. ARTIFICIAL PERCEPTION OF SIMILARITY IN 
OCR 
In the particular case analyzed here, the dissimilarity between 
two hypostases of two different characters is artificially 
represented as linear separation. For example, when a 
perceptron instructed to recognize the character „A‟ against all 
the other characters is fully trained, all instances of „A‟ from 
the training set are linearly separated from all instances of all 
the other characters by a hyperplane whose parameters form 
the trained memory W. Hence, the difference D between the 
minimum activation computed for the positive examples and 
the maximum activation obtained for the negative examples is 
an artificial perception of the dissimilarity (separation) 
between the two classes. Let Xmin
+  be the positive example that 
realizes the minimum activation and let Xmax
−  be the negative 
example that realizes the maximum activation. With this 
notations, the number D/||W|| is the distance between two 
hyperplanes orthogonal to W, one containing Xmin
+  and the 
other containing Xmax
− . Hence, the number d‟=D/||W|| is also an 
artificial perception of the dissimilarity between the two 
classes (namely: C+ containing „A‟ instances, and C− 
containing instances of other characters).  
On the other hand, the distance between the two sets C+ and 
C−, 
d C+,C− =min( d X, Y   X∈ C+, Y∈ C−}) (9) 
is the most objective expression of the dissimilarity between 
the two classes C+ and C−. The question is how accurate is the 
artificial perception d‟ compared to actual distance d.  
Let Xmax
+  be the positive example that realizes the maximum 
activation and let Xmin
−  be the negative example that realizes 
the minimum activation. Then the number 
 W.Xmax
+  - W.Xmin
+   /  W  is an artificial perception for the 
diameter of the class C+, whereas the number 
 W.Xmax
−  - W.Xmin
−   /  W  is an artificial perception for the 
diameter of C−. 
All in all, the trained memory W sets up an artificial 
perception (a geometrical view/perspective) that imprecisely 
encodes the diameter of C−, the distance from C− to C+ and 
the diameter of C+ as the numbers  W.Xmax
−  - W.Xmin
−   /  W  , 
d(C+, C−) and  W.Xmax
+  - W.Xmin
+   /  W . This situation 
allows us to establish an artificial 3D geometrical 
conventional representation of the two classes and of the 
perceived separation between them. The comparison between 
the ratio d‟/d and the real unit tells us when the artificial 
perception of the separation between the two classes of 
characters is objective or maximally cointensive with the 
reality (d‟/d=1), fuzzy undervaluated (d‟/d<1), or fuzzy 
overvaluated (d/d‟<1). This is why we sustain that even in the 
  
5 
classic perceptron the artificial perception / learning is fuzzy 
(in terms of results). Besides, the update procedure through 
which the memory of the perceptron changes can be a part of a 
fuzzy if-then Sugeno rule [17] also. For example, let us 
consider the following class of if-then linguistic control rules: 
IF: 
C− and C+ are two 
separable classes of 
examples 
THEN: 
 
And  
W is a memory that must 
be trained 
 
the update rule 
(Wn+1,tn+1) = (Wn, tn) 
+ U(SP(n), n) 
converges rapidly 
enough to a 
sufficiently 
well-trained 
memory W . 
And 
N is an well-chosen  
maximal number of 
epochs 
And 
R is a well-chosen real 
function having the 
abscise as asymptote at 
+∞ 
And  
SP is an well-chosen 
procedure of selecting 
four examples on which 
the memory W is trained 
during an epoch  
 
instantiated as follows: 
- C+ contains 34 „A‟ instances, each of them 
memorized as 8-bit unsigned integer matrices of 
dimension 16x16, and C−contains 34 instances for 
each of the other characters, memorized in the same 
manner; 
- W is a memory randomly initialized;  
- N is 1000; 
- R n = n* log
2
 n  /2n; 
- the selection procedure SP return the first two 
positive examples currently producing the smallest 
activations  Xmin
1+ , Xmin
2+   and the first two negative 
examples currently producing the greatest activations 
 Xmax
1− , Xmax
2−  ; 
-  the update rule assumes that:  
Wn+1 = Wn +  Xmin
1+  + Xmin
2+   *R(n), tn+1 = tn –   Wn  
Wn+1 = Wn -  Xmax
1−  + Xmax
2−   *R(n), tn+1 = tn +   Wn  
 
 
Fig. 3. Convergence of all synaptic memory components along the increasing 
number of epochs 
 
Fig. 4. Convergence of the neuronal threshold along the increasing number of 
epochs 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Convergence of the minimum intraclass activation and maximum 
interclass activation, along the increasing number of epochs 
 
An implementation of the above fuzzy training rule 
produced the results presented in figures 3-5 after 43 epochs. 
The only problem is that the distance between the classes C− 
and C+ as it is artificially perceived by the neuron is 
approximately d‟=216, whereas the actual distance between 
the two classes is approximately d=730, hence the artificial 
perception of the separation between the two classes of 
characters is undervaluated (i.e. d‟/d<1). The perceived 
diameters of the classes C+ and C− are 758 and 380, whereas 
the actual diameters of the two classes are 2019 and 3060, 
respectively.  
However, accordingly to a very simple Turing test [18], the 
human decisions on recognizing characters are binary and 
have nothing to do with the numerical representations 
mentioned above. This is an example in which the human 
perception is actually crisp, whereas the artificial perception is 
actually fuzzy (partial, imprecise). 
IV. HUMAN VS. ARTIFICIAL PERCEPTION OF SIMILARITY IN 
IRIS RECOGNITION 
The most popular way of comparing two binary iris codes is to 
compute the Hamming distance or the Hamming similarity for 
the two codes. In this case, the similarity score is a fuzzy value 
within [0,1]. However, as seen in [13], Hamming distance 
corresponds to an artificial perception encoded as a synaptic 
memory referred to as an untrained discriminant direction (see 
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the formulae 1-4 in [13]).  
In iris recognition, the training of the discriminant 
directions aims to diminish the confusion between the fuzzy 
intervals that underlay the biometric decisions (see Fig.1 from 
[11], and Fig. 4-5 from [3], for example).  
An incipient stage of training the discriminant directions 
would mean that a narrow safety band (Fig. 2-3 from [13]) 
separates the two classes of imposter and genuine scores. An 
advanced stage of training the discriminant directions means 
that a comfortably wide safety band (Fig. 4-5 from [13]) 
separates the two classes of genuine and imposter scores. 
Nevertheless, as seen in Fig. 2-5 from [13], the biometric 
decisions corresponds to a fuzzy partitioning of the [0,1] 
interval, regardless the fact that the discriminant directions are 
trained (sufficiently) or not, i.e. in iris recognition, the 
artificial perception of the similarity between individuals is 
fuzzy.  
On the contrary, accordingly to a very simple Turing test, 
the human decisions on recognizing irides are binary (as seen 
in Fig. 1.a [12]). This is another example in which the human 
perception is actually crisp, whereas the artificial perception is 
actually fuzzy (partial, imprecise). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Zadeh insisted on the ideas that (human) “perceptions, in 
general, are both fuzzy and granular or, for short, f-granular” 
and that “in much, perhaps most, of human reasoning and 
concept formation, the granules are fuzzy”. According to this 
point of view, human reasoning, human concepts and human 
perceptions are f-granular.  
On the contrary, in the two practical examples given here 
(Optical Character Recognition and Iris Recognition) in order 
to illustrate the concept of artificial perception, the situation is 
a little bit different. In both cases a simple Turing test shows 
that artificial perceptions of the dissimilarity between two 
different characters and between two different irides are fuzzy, 
whereas the corresponding human perceptions are, in fact, 
crisp. Despite being contradictory to Zadeh‟s belief expressed 
above, this fact comes very naturally, because ultimately, a 
perceptron emulates the human intelligent behavior through an 
artificial one, which compared to the original is weakened and 
imprecise enough. 
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